Abstract. We study the security of partial-domain hash signature schemes, in which the output size of the hash function is only a fraction of the modulus size. We show that for e = 2 (Rabin), partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model, if the output size of the hash function is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. This provides a security proof for a variant of the signature standards ISO 9796-2 and PKCS#1 v1.5, in which a larger digest size is used.
Introduction
A common practice for signing with RSA or Rabin consists in first hashing the message m, then padding the hash value with some predetermined or messagedependent block, and eventually raising the result µ(m) to the private exponent d. This is commonly referred to as the "hash-and-sign" paradigm:
For digital signature schemes, the strongest security notion was defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest in [?] , as existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack. This notion captures the property that an attacker cannot produce a valid signature, even after obtaining the signature of (polynomially many) messages of his choice.
The random oracle model, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in [?] , is a theoretical framework allowing to prove the security of hash-and-sign signature schemes. In this model, the hash function is seen as an oracle which outputs a random value for each new query. Bellare and Rogaway defined in [?] the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme, in which the output size of the hash function is the same as the modulus size. FDH is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming that inverting RSA is hard. Actually, a security proof in the random oracle model does not necessarily imply that the scheme is secure in the real world (see [?] ). Nevertheless, it seems to be a good engineering principle to design a scheme so that it is provably secure in the random oracle model. Many encryption and signature schemes were proven to be secure in the random oracle model
Other hash-and-sign signature schemes include the widely used signature standards PKCS#1 v1.5 and ISO 9796-2. In these standards, the digest size is only a fraction of the modulus size. As opposed to FDH, no security proof is known for those standards. Moreover, it was shown in [?] that ISO 9796-2 was insecure if the size of the hash function was too small, and the standard was subsequently revised.
In this paper, we study the security of partial-domain hash signature schemes, in which the hash size is only a fraction of the modulus size. We show that for e = 2, partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model, assuming that factoring is hard, if the size of the hash function is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. The proof is based on a modification of Vallée's generator of small random squares [?] . This provides a security proof for a variant of PKCS#1 v1.5 and ISO 9796-2 signatures, in which the digest size is larger than 2/3 of the size of the modulus.
Definitions
In this section we briefly present some notations and definitions used throughout the paper. We start by recalling the definition of a signature scheme.
Definition 1 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Verify) is defined as follows:
-The key generation algorithm Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which given 1 k , outputs a pair of matching public and private keys, (pk, sk).
-The signing algorithm Sign takes the message M to be signed, the private key sk, and returns a signature x = Sign sk (M ). The signing algorithm may be probabilistic.
-The verification algorithm Verify takes a message M , a candidate signature x and pk. It returns a bit Verify pk (M, x ), equal to one if the signature is accepted, and zero otherwise. We require that if x ← Sign sk (M ), then Verify pk (M, x) = 1.
In the previously introduced existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack scenario, the forger can dynamically obtain signatures of messages of his choice and attempt to output a valid forgery. A valid forgery is a message/signature pair (M, x) such that Verify pk (M, x) = 1 whereas the signature of M was never requested by the forger. Moreover, in the random oracle model, the attacker cannot evaluate the hash function by himself; instead, he queries an oracle which outputs a random value for each new query.
RSA [?] is undoubtedly the most widely used cryptosystem today: Definition 2 (RSA). The RSA cryptosystem is a family of trapdoor permutations, specified by: -The RSA generator RSA, which on input 1 k , randomly selects two distinct k/2-bit primes p and q and computes the modulus N = p · q. It picks an encryption exponent e ∈ Z * φ(N ) and computes the corresponding decryption exponent d such that e · d = 1 mod φ(N ). The generator returns (N, e, d).
An inverting algorithm I for RSA gets as input (N, e, y) and tries to find y d mod N . Its success probability is the probability to output y d mod N when (N, e, d) are obtained by running RSA(1 k ) and y is set to x e mod N for some x chosen at random in Z * N . The Full-Domain-Hash scheme (FDH) [?] was the first practical and provably secure signature scheme based on RSA. It is defined as follows: the key generation algorithm, on input 1 k , runs RSA(1 k ) to obtain (N, e, d). It outputs (pk, sk), where the public key pk is (N, e) and the private key sk is (N, d) . The signing and verifying algorithms use a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * N which maps bit strings of arbitrary length to the set of invertible integers modulo N .
The following theorem [?] proves the security of FDH in the random oracle model, assuming that inverting RSA is hard. It provides a better security bound than [?] . Theorem 1. Assume that there is no algorithm which inverts RSA with probability greater than ε within time t. Then the success probability of a FDH forger making at most q hash hash queries and q sig signature queries within running time t is less than ε , where
We say that a hash-and-sign signature scheme is a partial-domain hash signature scheme if the encoding function µ(m) can be written as:
where γ is a constant, H a hash function and f some function of m. A typical example of a partial-domain hash signature scheme is the ISO 9796-2 standard with full message recovery [?]:
The main result of this paper is to show that for e = 2, partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure, if the hash size is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. In the following, we recall the Rabin-Williams signature scheme [?] . It uses a padding function µ(m) such that for all m, µ(m) = 6 mod 16.
-Key generation: on input 1 k , generate two k/2-bit primes p and q such that p = 3 mod 8 and q = 7 mod 8. The public key is N = p · q and the private key is d = (N − p − q + 5)/8.
-Signature generation: compute the Jacobi symbol
The signature of m is s = min(σ, N − σ), where:
2 mod N and check that:
Security of Partial-domain Hash Signature Schemes
To prove the security of a signature scheme against chosen message attacks, one must be able to answer the signature queries of the attacker. In FDH's security proof, when answering a hash query, one generates a random r ∈ Z N and answers H(m) = r e mod N so that the signature r of m is known. Similarly, for partialdomain hash signature schemes, we should be able to generate a random r such that:
with H(m) being uniformly distributed in the output space of the hash function. For example, if we take µ(m) = H(m) where 0 ≤ H(m) ≤ N β and β < 1, one should be able to generate a random r such that r e mod N is uniformly distributed between 0 and N β .
Up to our knowledge, no such algorithm is known for e ≥ 3. For e = 2, Vallée constructed in [?] a random generator where the size of r 2 mod N is less than 2/3 of the size of the modulus.
[?] used this generator to obtain proven complexity bounds for the quadratic sieve factoring algorithm. Vallée's generator has a quasi-uniform distribution; a distribution is said to be quasi-uniform if there is a constant such that for all x, the probability to generate x lies between 1/ and times the probability to generate x under the uniform distribution. However, quasi-uniformity is not sufficient here, as we must simulate a random oracle and therefore our simulation should be indistinguishable from the uniform distribution.
Our contribution is to modify Vallée's generator in order to generate random squares in any interval of size N 2/3+ε , with a distribution which is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. From this generator we will derive a security proof for partial-domain hash signatures, in which the digest size is at least 2/3 of the modulus size.
Remark: for Paillier's trapdoor permutation [?] with parameter g = 1 + N , it is easy to show that half-domain hash is provably secure in the random oracle model, assuming that inverting RSA with e = N is hard.
Generating Random Squares in a Given Interval

Notations
We identify Z N , the ring of integers modulo N with the set of integers between 0 and N − 1. We denote by Z + N the set of integers between 0 and (N − 1)/2. We denote by Q the squaring operation over Z N :
Given positive integers a and h such that a + h < N , let B be the set:
Our goal is to generate integers x ∈ B with a distribution statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y is defined as the function:
We say that two ensembles X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N are statistically indistinguishable if their statistical distance δ n is a negligible function of n.
Description of B
In this section, we recall Vallée's description of the set B. We denote by b the cardinality of B. The following lemma, which proof can be derived from equation (6) in [?] , shows that b is close to h/2. Lemma 1. Let N be a -bit RSA modulus. We have for ≥ 64:
In the following, we assume that the bit size of N is greater than 64. Given p/q ∈ F k , we define the Farey interval I(p, q) as the interval of center pN/(2q) and radius N/(2kq). Given the terms p /q and p /q of F k which precede and follow p/q, we let J(p, q) be the interval:
If p/q = 0/1, then p/q has no predecessor and we take p /q = 0/1. Similarly, if p/q = 1/1, we take p /q = 1/1. The set of intervals J(p, q) forms a partition of Z + N . The following lemma [?] shows that intervals I(p, q) and J(p, q) are closely related.
Lemma 2. I(p, q) contains J(p, q) and its length is at most twice the length of J(p, q).
Given p/q ∈ F k with p/q = 0/1, let x 0 be the integer nearest to the rational pN/2q:
Let L(x 0 ) be the lattice spanned by the two vectors (1, 2x 0 ) and (0, N ). Let P 1 and P 2 be the two parabolas of equations:
Let P be the domain of lattice points comprised between the two parabolas:
The following lemma, which proof is straightforward, shows that the elements of B arise from the intersection of the lattice L(x 0 ) and the domain comprised between the two parabolas (see figure ?? ).
Lemma 3. x = x 0 + u belongs to B iff there exists a unique ω such that the point (u, ω) belongs to P .
We let B(p, q) be the set of integers in B ∩ J(p, q). From Lemma ?? the integers in B(p, q) arise from the domain of lattice points: From Lemma ??, the set P (p, q) is included inside the set of lattice points:
whose abcissae u are comprised between −u 0 − N/(2kq) and −u 0 + N/(2kq).
In the following, we describe the domain Q(p, q), using the following two short vectors of L(x 0 ) (see figure ? ?):
where p /q is the term of F k which precedes p/q. We consider the lines of the lattice parallel to vector r which intersect the domain Q(p, q). These lines have a slope equal to 2u 0 . The first extremal position of these lines is the tangent D 0 to the first parabola:
The second extremal position joins the two points of the second parabola with abscissae −u 0 − N/(2kq) and −u 0 + N/(2kq). This line D 3 has also a slope equal to 2u 0 and satisfies the equation:
The two lines intersect the vertical axis at the respective points:
All the lines parallel to r that intersect P (p, q) are the ones that intersect the segment [ω 3 , ω 0 ] on the vertical axis. We denote by D(ν) a line parallel to r which intersects the vertical axis at ordinate equal to ω 0 − νN/q. The line D 0 is the line D(ν 0 = 0), whereas the line D 3 is the line D(ν 3 ) such that:
Eventually, we denote by D 1 = D(ν 1 ) the line which joins the two points of the first parabola with abcissae −u 0 − N/(2kq) and −u 0 + N/(2kq), and by D 2 = D(ν 2 ) the tangent to the second parabola, with a slope equal to 2u 0 . We have:
. The difference between two consecutive indices is equal to one.
Our New Generator
In this section, we describe our new generator of integers in B. The difference with Vallée's generator is that we use different parameters for k and h, and we do not generate all the integers in B; instead we avoid a negligible subset of B.
First, we describe a generator G(p, q) of integers in B(p, q), and we show that its distribution is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. We assume that N ≤ 2 · k · q · √ h, which gives ν 1 ≤ ν 2 . Therefore the line D 1 is above the line D 2 (see figure ?? ). We restrict ourselves to the integers in B(p, q) such that the corresponding points (u, ω) ∈ P (p, q) lie on D(ν) with ν 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν 2 . These points are the points on D(ν) whose abscissae u are such that x 0 + u ∈ J(p, q).
Generator G(p, q) of integers in B(p, q): 1. Generate a random index ν uniformly distributed between ν 1 and ν 2 . 2. Generate a point (u, ω) ∈ P (p, q) on D(ν) such that x 0 + u ∈ J(p, q), with the uniform distribution. 3. Output x 0 + u.
The following lemma shows that under some conditions on k, h and q, the cardinality b(p, q) of B(p, q) is close to h · j(p, q)/N , where j(p, q) is the number of integers in the interval J(p, q). Moreover, under the same conditions, the distribution induced by G(p, q) is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution in B(p, q). The proof is given in appendix ??. 
Moreover, G(p, q) generates elements in B(p, q) with a distribution whose distance δ G from the uniform distribution is at most 7 · N −3α .
Now we construct a generator V of p/q ∈ F k such that the probability to generate p/q is close to b(p, q)/b. It only generates p/q ∈ F k such that q ≥ N 1/3−4α , so that from the previous lemma, b(p, q) is nearly proportional to the number of integers in J(p, q), and the distribution induced by G(p, q) is close to the uniform distribution.
Generator V of p/q ∈ F k 1. Generate a random integer x ∈ Z + N with the uniform distribution.
Determine which interval
Lemma 5. Let denote by D the distribution induced by choosing p/q ∈ F k with probability b(p, q)/b. Under the conditions of lemma ??, the statistical distance δ V between D and the distribution induced by V is at most 9 · N −3α .
Proof. See appendix ??.
Eventually, our generator G of elements in B combines the two generators V and G(p, q):
Generator G of x ∈ B 1. Generate y using V. 2. If y = ⊥, then output ⊥. 3. Otherwise, y = p/q and generate x ∈ B(p, q) using G(p, q). Output x.
The following theorem, whose proof is given in appendix ??, shows that the distribution induced by G is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution in B. 
A Security Proof for Partial-domain Hash Signature Schemes
In this section, using the previous generator G of random squares, we show that partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model, for e = 2, assuming that factoring is hard, if the size of the hash function is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to small constants γ in (??), e.g. γ = 16 or γ = 256. This is the case for all the signature standards of the next section. We denote by k 0 the hash function's digest size. The proof is similar to the proof of theorem ?? and is given in the full version of this paper [?] .
Theorem 4. Let S be the Rabin-Williams partial-domain hash signature scheme with constant γ and hash size k 0 bits. Assume that there is no algorithm which factors a RSA modulus with probability greater than ε within time t. Then the success probability of a forger against S making at most q hash hash queries and q sig signature queries within time t is upper bounded by ε , where:
(7)
and
6 Application to Signature Standards The standard PKCS#1 v1.5 was not designed to work with Rabin (e = 2). However, one can replace the last nibble of H(m) by 6 and obtain a padding scheme which is compatible with the Rabin-Williams signature scheme. The standard is then provably secure if the size of the hash-function is larger than 2/3 of the size of the modulus. This is much larger than the 128 or 160 bits which are recommended in the standard. The same analysis applies for the SSL-3.02 padding scheme [?]. 
Conclusion
We have shown that for Rabin, partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure in the random oracle, assuming that factoring is hard, if the size of the hash function is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. Unfortunately, this is much larger than the size which is recommended in the standards PKCS#1 v1.5 and ISO 9796-2. An open problem is to obtain a smaller bound for the digest size, and to extend this result to RSA signatures.
A Proof of lemma ??
From the conditions of lemma ??, we obtain:
which gives N ≤ 2 · k · q · √ h and then ν 1 < ν 2 . Recall that j(p, q) denotes the number of integers in interval J(p, q). From lemma ?? the length of J(p, q) is at least N/(2kq) and therefore, j(p, q) ≥ N/(2kq) − 1, which gives using k ≥ 6:
Let us denote by n(ν) the number of points of P (p, q) on a line D(ν). The distance between the abcissae of two consecutive points of P (p, q) on a line D(ν) is equal to q. Therefore, for all indices ν, we have n(ν) ≤ j(p, q)/q + 1. Moreover, for ν 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν 2 , n(ν) is either j(p, q)/q or j(p, q)/q + 1. This gives the following bound for b(p, q):
which gives using (??), (??), (??), (??) and N α ≥ 3:
Let n be the number of indices ν such that ν 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν 2 . We have n = ν 2 −ν 1 or n = ν 2 − ν 1 + 1. The probability that G(p, q) generates an element x ∈ B(p, q) corresponding to a point of index ν is given by:
for ν 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν 2 and P (ν) = 0 otherwise. The number of integers x ∈ B(p, q) such that Pr[x] = 0 is then at most:
For all ν 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν 2 , we have using (??), (??), (??), (??), (??) and N α ≥ 3:
Eventually, the statistical distance from the uniform distribution is:
and we obtain using (??), (??) and (??):
B Proof of lemma ??
Let us denote q m = N 1/3−4α . For q ≥ q m , the probability to generate p/q ∈ F k using V is j(p, q)/|Z + N |. Moreover, using lemma ??, the probability that V generates ⊥ is at most:
Consequently, the statistical distance δ V between D and the distribution induced by V is at most:
Let be the size of N in bits. From lemma ??, we obtain for ≥ 64:
For q ≥ q m , we obtain from Lemma ?? and (??):
This gives:
From (??) and using:
we obtain:
From equation (??) and inequalities (??), (??) and (??), we obtain:
C Proof of theorem ??
The generator G combines the generators V and G(p, q). Moreover, V generates p/q ∈ F k such that the statistical distance δ G of the distribution induced by G(p, q) from the uniform distribution in B(p, q) is at most 7 · N −3α . Therefore the statistical distance δ of G from the uniform distribution in B is at most:
